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Why	Trump’s	pull-out	of	the	Paris	Agreement	may
open	the	door	for	state	Governors	to	push	their	own
climate	action.
In	June,	President	Trump	announced	that	the	US	would	be	withdrawing	from	the	Paris	Agreement
on	climate	change,	prompting	some	US	cities	and	states	to	reaffirm	their	own	commitments	to	the
agreement.	In	new	research,	Katja	Biedenkopf	looks	at	how	federal	inaction	can	spur	state
Governors	to	push	for	ambitious	policies	to	mitigate	climate	change.	She	cautions	that	such	actions
are	not	always	completely	altruistic;	some	Governors	can	be	motivated	by	a	desire	for	career
advancement	or	to	promote	their	own	state’s	interests,	which	can	lead	to	short-lived	initiatives	that
are	quickly	abandoned.
President	Trump’s	announcement	to	withdraw	the	United	States	from	the	Paris	Agreement	on	climate	change	in
June	2017	triggered	the	promise	by	a	multitude	of	US	cities	and	states	to	pursue	and	strengthen	their	own
climate	action,	thereby	counterbalancing	the	impact	of	the	federal	government’s	policy	choice.	Former	President
Obama	and	Secretary	of	State	Kerry	invested	major	diplomatic	efforts	and	skills	in	the	international	process	to
make	possible	an	ambitious	international	agreement	that	would	set	the	world	on	a	path	to	avoid	damaging
climatic	change	with	serious	implications	for	future	generations.	The	radical	policy	change	in	the	US	and	the
subsequent	reactions	beg	the	question	to	what	extent	cities	and	states	can	contribute	to	the	US	keeping	its
promise	made	in	Paris.	Governors	can	be	important	players	in	this	context.	I	analysed	the	entrepreneurship	of	US
governors	in	the	case	of	state-level	greenhouse	gas	emissions	trading	policies	in	order	to	provide	a	better
understanding	of	the	drivers	of	ambitious	gubernatorial	entrepreneurship	and	state-level	climate	action	in	the
United	States.
What	motivates	Governors	to	address	climate	change?
The	fact	that	states	and	cities	are	stepping	in	after	the	federal	government	gave	up	on	the	Paris	Agreement
suggests	that	their	leaders	are	convinced	that	climate	change	policy	needs	to	be	adopted	to	avoid	harm	to
people’s	lives.	This	is	not	the	only	possible	motivation;	not	all	gubernatorial	decisions	are	grounded	in	the	desire
to	mitigate	climate	change.	Governors	can	also	be	motivated	by	the	potential	for	their	career	to	be	boosted:	by
pushing	for	innovative	and	ambitious	climate	policy,	governors	can	increase	their	prominence,	develop	a	national
profile,	construct	a	legacy	and	advance	their	career	by	claiming	credit	for	the	adoption	of	the	policy.	A	third
motivation	can	be	the	support	and	furthering	of	the	interests	of	a	Governor’s	state.	Governors	can	push	for	a
policy	innovation	in	an	attempt	to	represent	and	advance	their	state’s	preferences	and	interests	in	anticipation	of
federal	policy	changes.	The	first,	more	personal,	motivation	leads	to	a	long-term	commitment	from	a	governor
while	the	two	latter	are	based	on	the	seizing	of	an	opportunity	as	it	emerges,	which	can	lead	to	fluctuations	in	a
governor’s	policy	positions	and	short-lived	initiatives.
To	understand	governors’	motivations,	the	federal-state	context	needs	to	be	considered.	When	the	federal
government	is	inactive,	it	creates	ample	scope	for	gubernatorial	entrepreneurship.	Strong	gubernatorial
entrepreneurs	can	seize	windows	of	opportunity	for	ambitious	climate	policy	that	are	opened	by	federal	inaction.
Those	governors	take	a	risk	because	of	the	uncertainty	whether	the	policy	will	be	(politically)	successful.	This
requires	strong	entrepreneurship	of	proactive	governors	that	perceive	the	need	to	push	for	their	ambitious	policy
ideas	(personal	ideational	motivation)	or	conceive	of	it	as	an	opportunity	to	attract	national	attention	(career
advancement	motivation).	When	federal	policy	is	anticipated	but	not	yet	developed,	weaker	gubernatorial
entrepreneurs	can	react	aiming	to	shape	the	to-be-designed	federal	rules	according	to	their	state-level
preferences	(jurisdictional	interest	motivation).
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In	the	case	of	state-level	greenhouse	gas	(GHG)	emissions	trading	in	the	United	States,	the	different	motivations
can	be	seen	at	play.	GHG	emissions	trading	is	a	climate	policy	in	which	an	overall	emissions	limit	is	set	for	all
entities	that	are	included	in	the	policy.	Covered	entities	obtain	emission	allowances	for	free	or	purchase	them	in
auctions.	The	number	of	allowances	in	the	possession	of	an	emitter	must	match	its	actual	emissions	during	a
defined	period	of	time.	Excess	allowances	can	be	sold	or	additional	allowances	need	to	be	purchased,	depending
on	an	emitter’s	emission	reduction	efforts.	Adopting	emissions	trading	policy	plans	has	not	been	limited	to	those
states	with	a	track	record	of	environmentally-progressive	policy	such	as	California	and	other	Western	and
Northeastern	states,	some	Midwestern	states,	which	are	less	associated	with	ambitious	climate	policy
innovations,	have	done	so	as	well.	Moreover,	the	development	of	GHG	emissions	schemes	has	fluctuated	with	a
peak	in	2007–2010	when	as	many	as	23	US	states	were	involved	in	developing	or	implementing	a	system.	Later,
13	states	withdrew	or	failed	to	implement	their	plans.
Governors	as	policy	entrepreneurs
In	a	survey	that	included	38	key	actors	involved	in	US	subnational	GHG	emissions	trading	policies,	I	identified
governors	George	Pataki	of	New	York	and	Arnold	Schwarzenegger	of	California	as	the	main	policy	entrepreneurs
driving	the	inception	and	adoption	of	the	Northeastern	Regional	Greenhouse	Gas	Initiative	(RGGI)	and	the
Western	Climate	Initiative	(WCI),	respectively.	No	single	strong	gubernatorial	entrepreneur	was	identified	for	the
Midwestern	Greenhouse	Gas	Reduction	Accord	(MGGRA),	which	was	adopted	but	never	implemented	and	died
a	silent	death.	In	the	case	of	RGGI,	two	additional	governors—Mitt	Romney	of	Massachusetts	and	Chris	Christie
of	New	Jersey—were	identified	to	have	played	a	role	that	could	be	seen	as	a	variation	of	entrepreneurship,
namely	strongly	advocating	against	their	state’s	adoption	of	a	GHG	emissions	trading	policy.
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Career	advancement	interests	appear	to	have	been	a	major	motivation	for	governors	Pataki	and
Schwarzenegger’s	entrepreneurial	and	also	governors	Christie	and	Romney’s	obstructing	activities.	Governor
Schwarzenegger’s	actions	also	show	that	he	likely	acted	out	of	personal	ideational	motivation.	Pataki’s	position
on	climate	policy	has	changed	over	the	course	of	his	political	career.	In	the	2016	race	for	the	US	Presidency,	his
position	had	changed	from	his	earlier	role	as	entrepreneur	in	pushing	for	RGGI,	suggesting	that	the	motivation
behind	his	earlier	entrepreneurship	was	career	advancement	rather	than	his	own	ideational	conviction.	Unlike
Pataki,	Schwarzenegger	shows	continuous	commitment	and	support	for	ambitious	climate	policy.	His	persistent
engagement	in	the	issue	strongly	suggests	that	Schwarzenegger’s	motivations	for	his	gubernatorial
entrepreneurship	included	personal	ideational	convictions	in	addition	to	crafting	his	legacy.	Christie	changed	his
position	on	climate	policy	in	the	run-up	to	the	2012	presidential	elections	suggesting	career	advancement
motivations	for	his	activities.	Governor	Romney’s	obstruction	of	GHG	ETS	adoption	in	Massachusetts	can	also	be
attributed	to	career	advancement	motivations	since	it	coincided	with	his	joining	the	presidential	race.
Federal	government	inaction	creates	windows	of	opportunity
Most	survey	participants	mentioned	federal-state	dynamics	as	one	of	the	triggers	of	the	respective	program’s
inception	(RGGI	82	percent,	WCI	92	percent,	MGGRA	100	percent).	There	is,	however,	a	clear	difference	in
terms	of	proactive	and	reactive	entrepreneurship.	In	the	case	of	RGGI,	proactive	triggers	were	almost	exclusively
mentioned	while	in	the	case	of	WCI	slightly	more	proactive	than	reactive	triggers	were	mentioned	but	both	figured
prominently	in	the	interviewees’	explanations.	In	the	case	of	MGGRA	predominantly	reactive	incentives	were
mentioned.	The	period	between	2007	and	2010	was	a	time	during	which	the	adoption	of	a	federal	law	seemed
likely.	The	adoption	of	the	MGGRA	falls	within	this	period	of	time.	WCI	was	concluded	in	early	2007,	meaning	it	is
a	borderline	case.
The	federal	context	thus	created	two	different	windows	of	opportunity	for	gubernatorial	entrepreneurship.	During
the	time	of	federal	inaction,	strong	proactive	gubernatorial	entrepreneurs	could	seize	the	opportunity	to	craft	a
national	profile	and	lead	the	way	for	federal	policy.	During	the	time	of	anticipated	federal	climate	policy,	additional
governors	engaged	in	weaker	reactive	entrepreneurship	trying	to	shape	future	federal	policy	according	to	their
respective	state	preferences	and	interests.	Both	2008	presidential	candidates	were	in	favour	of	adopting	federal
climate	legislations,	including	GHG	emissions	trading	and	a	2007	Supreme	Court	ruling	requested	the	federal
Environmental	Protection	Agency	to	revisit	its	Bush-era	decision	not	to	designate	CO2	as	an	air	pollutant.
My	analysis	of	US	state-based	GHG	emissions	trading	suggests	that	strong	and	proactive	gubernatorial
entrepreneurs	can	seize	opportunities	for	ambitious	climate	policy	provided	by	a	federal-state	context	in	which	the
federal	government	is	inactive.	With	increasing	likelihood	of	imminent	federal	policy,	additional	governors	become
active	but	their	reactive	entrepreneurship	tends	to	be	weaker	since	they	respond	to	a	different	window	of
opportunity	in	which	they	take	a	lower	risk	than	the	strong	proactive	first-mover	gubernatorial	entrepreneurs.
Strong	and	weak	entrepreneurship	seem	motivated	by	different	rationales.	Strong	gubernatorial	entrepreneurs
appear	driven	by	career	advancement	and/or	personal	ideational	motivations.	Weak	gubernatorial	entrepreneurs
seem	driven	by	jurisdictional	interest-related	motivations.
President	Trump’s	dismantling	of	US	federal	climate	policy	has	started	to	open	a	new	window	of	opportunity	for
strong	and	proactive	gubernatorial	entrepreneurs	but	also	other	policy-makers’	entrepreneurship.	If	they	are
motivated	by	the	necessity	of	climate	action	rather	than	by	a	motivation	to	increase	their	prominence,	construct	a
legacy	and	advance	their	career,	then	their	efforts	could	endure	and	yield	lasting	results.	If	the	US	is	to	continue
to	remain	committed	to	climate	mitigation,	then	a	number	of	strong	gubernatorial	entrepreneurs	seem	necessary
to	counterbalance	the	federal	government’s	activities.
This	article	is	based	on	the	paper,	‘Gubernatorial	entrepreneurship	and	United	States	federal-state
interaction’	in	Environment	and	Planning	C:	Politics	and	Space.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.					
Note:		This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	USAPP	–	American	Politics	and	Policy,
nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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